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Vaccination of domestic poultry against avian influenza (AI) has been used on a large-scale in South East 
Asia since 2003 and in Egypt since 2006 to fight H5N1 highly-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
epidemics. The decision to use mass vaccination against HPAI in Egypt was taken as an emergency measure 
based on positive impact of such control measures in Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China. However, 
three years on, the impact on disease control of AI vaccination in Egypt has been very limited. Despite the 
continuous vaccination of poultry against HPAI, poultry outbreaks and human cases are reported regularly. 
A recent assessment study highlighted substantial weaknesses in the current immunisation programme and 
its lack of positive impact on the spread of infection or the maintenance of public health safety. The 
shortcomings of the vaccination strategy may be attributed in part to a lack of sufficient support in terms of 
funding and communication, the absence of an efficient monitoring system, and inadequate training of field 
technicians. The difficulties of blanket vaccinations in semi-commercial farms and household poultry sectors 
are well known, however, improvements in the industrial sector should be possible though better government 
controls and greater collaboration with the private sector. AI vaccination should be regarded as just one 
control tool within a broader disease control program integrating surveillance, outbreak investigation, disease 
management systems, and the rigorous implementation of bio-security measures. If incorrectly implemented, 
AI vaccination has a limited impact as a disease control measure. Moreover, without strict bio-security 
precautions undertaken during its application, farm visits to vaccinate poultry could facilitate the spread of 
the virus and therefore become a risk factor with important implications on the maintenance of the virus and 
potential risk for human exposure. 
 





Vaccination could be a useful tool in controlling avian 
influenza (AI) outbreaks. However, a carefully conceived 
vaccination strategy must be accompanied by strict bio-
security measures and efficient monitoring systems.   
Countries which have authorized vaccination to control 
avian influenza outbreaks under special circumstances in 
the past have met with contradictory results, from effective 
control and disease eradication to antigenic drift of the 
viral strain (Lee et al, 2004; Busani et al, 2009; Capua et 
al, 2009). Extensive vaccination programs are currently  
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ongoing in South East Asia and Egypt to control the H5N1 
HPAI epidemics (Peyre et al, 2009; Domenech et al, 
2009). Some of these countries have succeeded in 
reducing HPAI incidence and thereby reducing human risk 
of infection (e.g., Vietnam and China). Vietnam has 
managed to bring the disease under control within two 
years by strictly adhering to vaccination guidelines and 
implementing efficient outbreak management (To et al, 
2007; Domenech et al, 2009). SAR Hong Kong was also 
able to control and even eradicate the H5N1 HPAI virus 
by using mass vaccination accompanied by high standard 
bio-security measures and efficient post-vaccination 
monitoring (Ellis et al, 2006). In contrast, countries which 
have implemented mass vaccination without extensive 
outbreak management and bio-security measures are still 
fighting to control the infection (e.g., Indonesia and Egypt) 
(Domenech et al, 2009; EMPRES/GLEWS, 2009). 
Vaccination does not confer complete sterilising immunity 
and some vaccinated birds may continue to be infected and 
hence be contagious. If not monitored properly, the virus 
can circulate silently within a vaccinated flock (Hulse-Post 
et al, 2005; Savill et al, 2006). Therefore vaccination must 
be integrated within a broader control program that 
includes outbreak management and efficient surveillance 
and monitoring systems. 
 
H5N1 HPAI virus appears to have emerged in Egypt in 
early 2006. During the first wave of outbreaks, only 
stamping-out (within 3 km of the initial outbreak), 
quarantine surveillance, and some movement control 
(within a 7 km radius from the outbreak location) 
measures were implemented in an attempt to contain the 
disease, achieving only limited success. Initially, 
emergency vaccination was used to protect grand-parent 
and parent flocks. However, the disease spread to most 
Governorates within a few weeks and the country was 
declared endemic in July 2008. The veterinary authorities 
considered vaccination to be the most efficient tool in 
controlling this infectious disease. At this stage (March 
2006), the decision was taken to vaccinate all commercial 
flocks, followed by vaccination of the household poultry, 
starting in May 2007. 
 
Three years later, the implementation of AI vaccination in 
Egypt has had a limited impact on disease control. Poultry 
outbreaks and human cases continue to be reported 
regularly (Table 1) (EMPRES/GLEWS, 2009). However, it 
is difficult to predict how the situation would have evolved 
if there had been no vaccination at all. A recent assessment 
study performed by FAO has highlighted substantial 
limitations in current immunisation practices, which have 
not curbed the spread of infection nor improved public 
health safety (Peyre, 2009). Among the possible explanatory 
factors are the limited incentives given to the veterinarian 
service staff carrying out vaccinations in the field and a lack 
of confidence and cooperation on the part of local 
communities. This report reviews the organisation and 
implementation of Egypt’s AI vaccination strategy and 
examines the factors behind its limited control of the disease 
and its impact on public health. 
 
EGYPTIAN AI VACCINATION STRATEGY 
 
AI vaccination in Egypt has been the main tool used over 
the past three years to control the H5N1 HPAI epidemic. 
The focus on vaccination appears to have distracted 
attention away from other essential/critical procedures and 
disease control measures such as surveillance, bio-security 
outbreak investigation, and disease management 
interventions. Indeed, more than 80% (24 million USD) of 
the available budget for HPAI control has been devoted to 
vaccination since the programme was launched (GOVS, 
2009). 
 
The national vaccination program for household poultry is 
organised by the government and vaccines are provided 
free-of-cost to local communities (Table 2). This program 
also covers farms with up to 500 birds. Six-monthly 
vaccination campaigns are carried out with some 
vaccination of “residuals” in between campaigns (birds 
which have not been vaccinated for various reasons, e.g., 
owners not on site during the visit; birds not presented to 
vaccinators, etc). Birds are vaccinated following a door-to-
door protocol with the vaccination team entering each 
house to vaccinate rooftop birds. 
 
Table 1: Number of annual HPAI outbreaks in commercial poultry farms and household poultry sector in Egypt (data provided by GOVS). 
 
Year 














2006  - -  1318  1318  4 2  317  323  1641 
2007  26 3  5  34  36  79  162  277  311 
2008  22  2  2  26 25  22 42  89  115 
2009  5 1  10  16  4 2  77  83  99 
Total  53 6  1335  1394  69  105  598  772  2166  
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Table 2: Main features of the AI vaccination strategy conducted by GOVS in household poultry in Egypt and its limitations. 
 
AI vaccination strategy in household poultry   Limitations 
2 campaigns per year, each one lasting 3 months 
Door-to-door vaccination protocol 
Limited coverage with a maximum of 36% of the total bird 
population being vaccinated. 
Risk for mechanical transfer of the virus with limited bio-
security precautions. 
Only one dose of vaccine is administered for all birds (no 
booster) 
Booster doses could be required with inactivated vaccines 
to confer long term protection and limit contact 
transmission especially in groups of mix ages and species 
Chicks and ducklings are vaccinated  Inactivated vaccines are not efficient in day old birds and 
vaccination at a young age could impair adult immunity 
In some Governorates, double or more volume dose of vaccine 
is given to ducks and geese 
Vaccination protocols are not harmonised within the 
country as there are no standard operating procedures in 
place; veterinarians tend to follow the instructions indicated 





Commercial farmers must assume the entire cost of 
vaccinations on their farms (farms with more than 500 
birds including sector 3 farms) and they are responsible for 
defining their own vaccination programs, including the 
choice of vaccine and vaccination protocols (Table 3). Due 
to limited supervision of public veterinary services 
(monitoring less than 6.5 % of the farms), there is no clear 
information on the AI vaccination practices and the scale 
of operations in the commercial sector. 
 
All imported AI vaccines are evaluated by the Central 
Laboratory for Evaluation of Veterinary Biologicals 
(CLEVB, certified ISO 17025) before being released to 
the market. AI vaccine evaluation is performed using 
international standards of quality insurance; the methods 
used include purity/quality, safety, sterility, and potency 
tests. The latter involves immunogenicity response in SPF 
chickens and challenge test against Egyptian isolates (in 
use for batch release since March 2009).  
 
There is no post-vaccination monitoring system in place 
for household poultry (Table 2). There is a surveillance 
protocol in place for commercial poultry farms (6.5% of 
the farms voluntarily submit samples for post-vaccination 
monitoring) (Table 3). 
 
IMPACT OF THE CURRENT EGYPTIAN 
VACCINATION STRATEGY 
 
Impact on disease control and surveillance 
Due to the practical difficulties involved in vaccinating 
household poultry in the field, the vaccine coverage is 
very low, with an average of 25-30% in the best 
vaccinated Governorates while dropping to as little as 1% 
in some villages (Rijks and ElMasry, 2009). The impact 
of the AI vaccination strategy on the control of the 
disease therefore is conspicuously limited. However, in 
villages where coverage has reached at least 50%, a lower 
H5N1 HPAI incidence rate has been observed (GOVS, 
personal communication).  
At the level of commercial farms, around 50-60% are 
thought to be vaccinating against AI (GOVS, personal 
communication). This higher level of coverage may be the 
reason why AI vaccination appears to be having a more 
positive impact in the commercial sector compared to the 
household poultry sector, with an important decrease in 
outbreaks reported in the years following the 
implementation of vaccination (Table 1). However, a 
proper impact study needs to be carried out to confirm 
these observations, as there may be considerable 
underreporting of the infection incidents (GOVS, personal 
communication). 
 
The current strategy for AI vaccination of household 
poultry in Egypt probably has become a risk factor in the 
spread of the infection due to: i) Limited understanding 
and use of bio-security precautions, for example, 
vaccinators do not use overshoes correctly, often wearing 
them inside their shoes to protect their feet and 
consequently failing to prevent potential mechanical 
transmission of viruses between houses during the door-to-
door vaccination campaigns (Figure 1A): ii) A lack of 
means to disinfect and clean, or dispose-off spoiled and 
contaminated needles between houses while vaccinating 
sick birds (Figures 1B): iii) The use of emergency ring 
vaccination as the first action following the declaration of 
an outbreak, starting with the remaining birds within the 
infected villages and moving out to neighbouring villages.  
On some occasions, vaccinations have been carried out 
even before proper outbreak management procedures, such 
as safe culling, the disposal of carcasses, and the 
disinfection of the premises, have been implemented. 
 
The efficacy of the vaccines currently in use in Egypt has 
been criticized due to the occurrence of numerous 
outbreaks within vaccinated villages. However, given the 
vaccine quality controls in place, this phenomenon 
probably relates more to the improper use of the vaccines 
(which would impair the level of immunity) rather than the 
efficacy of the vaccine itself. Indeed, while it has been 
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Table 3. Main features of the AI vaccination strategy conducted in commercial poultry in Egypt and its limitations. 
 
AI vaccination strategy in commercial farms   Limitations 
One dose is administered to broilers and multiple doses to 
layers and breeders 
 
Vaccination protocol varies from farm to farm as no proper 
standardised protocols are in place, most of sector 3 farms 
do not vaccinate the broilers  
Day old chicks are vaccinated in hatcheries 
  
Inactivated vaccines are not efficient in day old birds and 
vaccination at a young age could impair adult immunity 
Most of duck and geese farms are not applying HPAI 
vaccination 
  
Without any regular monitoring, there is a risk of the silent 
circulation of the field virus in the environment (ducks and 
geese usually are asymptotic carriers) 
Some post-vaccination monitoring is performed by private 
laboratories 
No information is available on vaccination coverage and 
effectiveness in farms 
National monitoring is done on a volunteer basis which 
represents only 6.5% of total farms 
There is an increasing risk of the silent circulation of the 
field virus within vaccinated flocks and the spread of the 






demonstrated that inactivated vaccines requires booster 
doses to confer mid-term protective level of immunity (up 
to 4 months) (Unger et al, 2008; Peyre et al, 2009), a 
single dose vaccination protocol currently is enforced in 
household poultry in Egypt. One-day old chicks are 
vaccinated with inactivated vaccines, although clinical 
trials conducted in Indonesia (Unger et al, 2008) have 
shown that this practice is inefficient and may impair adult 
immunity, thereby limiting the efficacy of subsequent 
vaccination.  Egyptian ducks and geese also are either not 
vaccinated or given the same dose as chickens, which is 
not sufficient to confer protective immunity in these 
species (Tian et al, 2005). Finally, current inactivated 
vaccines may only confer limited protection in local 
Egyptian avian breeds; no study has yet been carried out 
on the efficacy of vaccines in local birds in the field 
(Sawitri et al, 2007). An FAO research project is currently 
ongoing to address both the issue of current vaccine 
efficacy in the field (in local breeds) and against all local 
strains of circulating viruses in Egypt (Avian Influenza 
Vaccine Efficacy Project Egypt (AIVEP)).  
 
The apparent reported decrease in disease incidence, which 
has been observed since the use of mass vaccination in 
Egypt (Table 1), may be the result of lower outbreak 
detection and inadequate reporting rather than immunity 
conferred by vaccination. Positive birds detected in live bird 
markets and data from participatory disease surveillance 
implemented as part of the SAIDR research project 
(Strengthening Avian Influenza Detecting and Response) 
(Rijks and ElMasry, 2009) have indicated the incidence of 
outbreaks on household poultry and commercial farms 
although farmers have not reported them. 
 
This inadequate reporting could be due to: 
 
• A lack of incentive for poultry owners to report 
outbreaks as there is no compensation scheme in place. 
• A lack of knowledge and misconceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of vaccination on the part of decision-
makers and field veterinarians. Decision-makers tend to 
believe that AI vaccination provides 100% protection in 
all vaccinated birds and hence can prevent all outbreaks. 
Local veterinary services consequently are reluctant to 
declare new outbreaks due to the fear of being unfairly 
blamed for failing to effectively perform their duties. 
While vaccinations are occasionally performed 
improperly, such as vaccination in outbreak areas or in 
their immediate vicinity, at other times new outbreaks are 
a reflection of the failure to reach sufficient vaccine 
coverage. 
 
Taken together, the limited vaccine efficacy of some 
vaccines against new viral isolates (Dr Elham, Director 
CLEVB, personal communication; Swayne and 
Kapczynski, 2008), a potentially lower protection in local 
breeds similar to what is being demonstrated in Indonesia 
(Sawitri et al, 2007; Unger et al, 2008), and no 
surveillance of circulating viruses in vaccinated areas have 
contributed to an under-reported circulation of the virus, 
which favours the persistency of the infection and 
increases the risks for bird to human transmission (GOVS, 
personal communication). 
 
Impact on public behaviour 
A false sense of security may be observed in some 
community members based on the belief that poultry 
vaccination can confer protection for human health. These 
individuals consequently do not feel the need to increase 
bio-security precautions when dealing with poultry or 
poultry products. At the same time, other community 
members are losing faith in government actions since 
numerous cases of sudden deaths in poultry have 
apparently followed poultry vaccination campaigns, 
leading to a loss of confidence in AI vaccination. This so 
called “post-vaccination sudden death” in fact may be 
explained by classic events that occur during vaccination  
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with the improper use of vaccines (vaccines injected at 
4°C or incorrect injection practices, spread of infection as 
no strict bio-security precautions are being followed 
during vaccination). The result is that poultry owners are 
becoming reluctant to vaccinate their birds. 
 
However, the community would be more inclined to 
follow bio-security precautions when dealing with poultry 
if; i) veterinary services staff observed proper procedures 
in terms of bio-security precautions during vaccination 
campaigns, outbreak investigations, culling operations, 
and ii) conveyed correct message to the public when given 
the opportunity. In reality, messages are not efficiently 
delivered by field veterinarians due to their limited 
training in correct stamping out practices and the 
advantages of control measures such as AI vaccination.   
Consequently, poultry owners put their health at risk by 
not believing and not applying public health safety 














Figure 1. A. Improper use of personal protective equipment 
during household poultry vaccination campaign: the vaccinator is 
wearing overshoes inside his shoes to protect his feet. B. 
Improper use of AI vaccines during household poultry 
vaccination campaign: A sick duckling is being vaccinated with 
an automatic syringe; poultry in the next house will be 
vaccinated with the same equipment prior disinfection.  
Impact on potential human pandemic 
In Egypt, clade 2.2 viruses seem to have evolved and 
diverged significantly compared to other viruses belonging 
to the same clade in Africa, Europe and Asia as 
demonstrated by the emergence of a distinct third order 
clade (namely 2.2.1), which includes all the Egyptian 
isolates analysed so far (Cattoli et al, 2009; 
WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group, 2009). 
However, it is difficult to determine without further 
investigations whether this is due to faster evolutionary 
rate of a distinct population of viruses, or the immune 
pressure of the vaccination strategy in place. There is 
evidence of increased virulence in birds and antigenic 
mutations away from the vaccine strains as some avian 
vaccines can no longer give full protection against viral 
mutants (Dr Elham, Director CLEVB, personal 
communication; Swayne and Kapczynski, 2008). 
However, there is no evidence that these genetic changes 
have any consequences on contagiousity or pathogenecity 
in humans. Attention should be paid to this potential effect 
and intensive monitoring of virus circulation should be set 
up for backyard and commercial systems. 
 
The inadequate implementation of vaccination campaigns 
compromises disease control and can give the public an 
erroneous impression that the risk to humans is reduced. 
 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECT 
VACCINATION PRACTICES 
 
Vaccination against HPAI should be considered as just one 
of several tools in a comprehensive HPAI control package 
that should include the improvement of surveillance systems 
and the proper implementation of outbreak investigations, 
disease management, and bio-security measures. AI 
vaccination increases resistance of the host to the disease, 
but will not ensure the complete prevention of infection nor 
the total absence of contact transmission (Peyre et al, 2009). 
Moreover, complete protective immunity takes two weeks 
to develop and multiple doses are required to confer long-
term protection (Peyre et al, 2009). The efficacy of AI 
vaccines also can be limited by the type of vaccine and its 
formulation (antigen content, adjuvant, viral strain) as well 
as age, species and type of breed of the targeted birds (Peyre 
et al, 2009). Soundly defined and integrated AI vaccination 
policies are required that include the definition of a national 
AI vaccination strategy, setting up the specific objectives of 
the vaccination and the action plan (vaccination program) to 
reach the objectives. The vaccination program should 
include detailed standard operating procedures for 
implementation (e.g., vaccination protocols – number and 
timing of the vaccine doses according to the poultry 
production type and bird species/breed), logistical planning, 
and routine evaluations and selection of vaccine according 
to the local context. Vaccination should not be performed 
during outbreaks or under limited bio-security precautions. 
Vaccination during outbreaks is not recommended because 
it not only fails to stop the infection of birds it probably 
contributes to propagating the infection and raises human 
health safety concerns. 
 
Properly regulated vaccination monitoring under 
government control, covering the commercial as well as  
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household sectors, is critical to ensure vaccination 
effectiveness and to monitor possible viral mutations in 
circulating viruses.  
 
An AI vaccination strategy also should include training 
and education of technical staff on vaccination issues (bio-
security, vaccine administration, correct use and disposal 
of personal protective equipment, professional ethics) and 
an outreach programme to enhance community awareness 
and cooperation. These elements are critical in disease 
control/elimination interventions, the prevention of disease 
spread in the animal population, and in the reduction of 
human exposure. 
 
Efficient awareness campaigns on bio-safety practices, 
including the safe-handling of birds for public health 
protection, are needed to increase cooperation between 
local populations and technical staff, and to limit public 
health risks, particularly the risk of infection for children 
(e.g., isolation of sick birds from the flock, preventing 
children from playing with suspect or dead birds). 
 
It is likely that H5N1 HPAI will persist in Egypt for some 
time, as is currently the case in several Southeast Asian 
countries. All of the epidemiological factors that are 
maintaining the virus in the environment are not yet 
clearly understood although ongoing research projects are 
trying to improve understanding of this complex 
epidemiology. For economical as well as sociological 
reasons, mass vaccination cannot be continued on a long-
term basis and exit strategies or more strategic, targeted 
vaccination need to be considered.  Vaccination should 
only be implemented as part of an overall HPAI control 
package that includes other control measures such as 
proper stamping out, bio-security improvements, and the 
control of movements of animals and animal products.  AI 
vaccination policy and strategies need to be reassessed 
periodically and operational plans revised according to 




AI vaccination only should be implemented if certain 
conditions are met.  These include the implementation of 
an efficient monitoring system and effective outreach 
programmes.  The latter is essential to ensure community 
cooperation needed for high vaccination coverage.  If this 
cannot be ensured, vaccination must not be considered to 
be a kind of miraculous tool that will allow the control and 
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